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Abstract
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes
rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mech-
anism design. We investigate the role of randomized outcomes (henceforth, “lotteries”) in the
context of a fundamental and archetypical multi-parameter mechanism design problem: selling
heterogeneous items to unit-demand bidders. To what extent can a seller improve its revenue
by pricing lotteries rather than items, and does this modification of the problem affect its com-
putational tractability? Our results show that the answers to these questions hinge on whether
consumers can purchase only one lottery (the buy-one model) or purchase any set of lotteries
and receive an independent sample from each (the buy-many model). In the buy-one model,
there is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the revenue-maximizing envy-free prices (thus
overcoming the inapproximability of the corresponding item pricing problem) and the revenue of
the optimal lottery system can exceed the revenue of the optimal item pricing by an unbounded
factor as long as the number of item types exceeds 4. In the buy-many model with n item types,
the profit achieved by lottery pricing can exceed item pricing by a factor of Θ(logn) but not
more, and optimal lottery pricing cannot be approximated within a factor of O(nε) for some
ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ ⋂
δ>0 BPTIME(2
O(nδ)). Our lower bounds rely on a mixture of geometric
and algebraic techniques, whereas the upper bounds use a novel rounding scheme to transform
a mechanism with randomized outcomes into one with deterministic outcomes while losing only
a bounded amount of revenue.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that randomness is a very useful resource for designing efficient algorithms, and
the same is true for designing truthful mechanisms to allocate resources among self-interested par-
ticipants with private inputs. Randomness plays several important roles in mechanism design.
First, while approximately optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms are required to solve in-
tractable problems in some cases, computationally efficient randomized truthful mechanisms can
often provide much better approximations. Second, in certain prior-free or online settings, random-
ness can offset the cost imposed by a lack of knowledge of agents’ types (private inputs), allowing
mechanisms to compete favorably against an optimal omniscient mechanism when deterministic
mechanisms cannot. In the absence of these two effects, i.e. when computational efficiency is not a
consideration and the designer has distributional information about the agents’ types (the Bayesian
setting), one might suspect that randomness provides no benefit. Riley and Zeckhauser [16] proved
that this is indeed true for revenue maximization in single-parameter settings. Surprisingly this
observation fails to extend to multi-parameter settings: Thanassoulis [18] and Manelli and Vin-
cent [11] independently noted that in multi-parameter settings a mechanism can use randomized
allocations to extract greater revenue from the agents than any deterministic allocation. The benefit
arises by allowing the mechanism to price-discriminate among agents to a greater extent by expand-
ing its allocation space to include probabilistic mixtures of outcomes. This use of randomization
has not yet been studied from a computer science perspective. Here we study randomized alloca-
tions (henceforth, “lotteries”) in the context of a fundamental and archetypical multi-parameter
mechanism design problem: selling heterogeneous items to unit-demand bidders.
There are a few reasons why we focus on unit-demand bidders and heterogeneous items. First,
it is the setting explored by Thanassoulis in his pioneering work on lotteries as an optimal selling
mechanism. That work raised fundamental questions about the extent to which lotteries can
improve a seller’s revenue; here we answer these questions. Second, unit-demand multi-product
pricing is one of the best known inapproximable problems in the theory of pricing algorithms [5, 9],
and is thus a test case for the general question, “Does pricing lotteries instead of items allow us
to circumvent the computational hardness of pricing problems?” We will see that the answer is
affirmative.
In more detail, the problems we consider in this paper involve selling n types of items. A
consumer is represented by a vector of n non-negative real numbers denoting her valuation for
receiving one copy of each item type. A lottery is specified by a price and a probability distribution
over the set of item types. Consumers are risk neutral and quasi-linear: their utility for a lottery is
equal to their expected valuation for a random sample from the item distribution, minus the price
of the lottery. They have unit demand: their valuation for a set of items is equal to their maximum
valuation for any element of that set. Given a distribution over consumers1 and a set of lotteries (a
lottery pricing system) the seller achieves a revenue equal to the expected price paid by a consumer
who is randomly sampled from the given distribution and chooses her utility-maximizing2 lottery.
The following example from [18] illustrates the power of lottery pricing systems. Suppose there
are two item types and a consumer’s valuations for the two items are independent and uniformly
distributed in an interval [a, b]. The optimal item pricing always sets the same price p∗ for both
items; the revenue-maximizing value of p∗ depends on a and b and can be found by solving a
quadratic equation. Figure 1(a) illustrates the resulting partition of the consumer type space into
three regions: those consumers who choose to buy item 1, those who choose item 2, and those who
choose to buy nothing. Now suppose that in addition to pricing both items at p∗, we also offer
1With the exception of Section 3.1, we allow distributions with infinite support.
2If the set of lotteries is infinite, we require it to be a closed subset of the space of all lotteries, topologized as a
subset of Rn+1. This requirement is necessary in order to ensure that there exists a utility-maximizing lottery.
1
a lottery at price p∗ − δ which yields one of the two items chosen uniformly at random. Some
of the consumers who originally bought items 1 or 2, but were nearly indifferent between them,
will now buy the lottery instead. This set of consumers is represented by the light shaded area in
Figure 1(b), and each such consumer pays δ less than they would have paid in the original item
pricing. However, this loss of revenue is counterbalanced by another set of consumers, represented
by the dark shaded area in Figure 1(b), who previously bought nothing but now pay p∗ − δ for
the lottery. If the values of a, b, δ are chosen appropriately, the second effect more than offsets the
first and results in a net increase in revenue. In effect, the lottery allows for price discrimination
between nearly-indifferent consumers and those who have a strong preference for one item type.
This additional price discrimination power allows the seller to improve revenue. In the example
discussed here, the seller’s net gain is quite moderate: less than 10% in all of the cases analyzed
in [18]. Thanassoulis leaves it as an open question to determine the greatest possible factor by
which the seller can increase revenue using lottery pricing, noting that it appears difficult to resolve
this question because of the complexity of solving the underlying optimization problem.
(p , p )* * 1
2
(a) Item pricing
1
2
(b) Lottery pricing
Figure 1: Item pricing versus
lottery pricing.
Our contributions. The preceding discussion raises two obvious
questions.
1. By what factor can the revenue obtained by optimal lottery
pricing exceed that obtained by optimal item pricing? Is there
any finite upper bound on this ratio? If so, how does the upper
bound depend on n?
2. What is the computational complexity of evaluating or ap-
proximating the optimal revenue obtained by lottery pricing?
We solve both of these questions. In fact, we distinguish two ver-
sions of the lottery pricing problem: the buy-one model, in which
consumers are only allowed to buy one lottery, and the buy-many
model, in which they can buy any number of lotteries and receive
an independent sample from each. It turns out that the answers to
questions 1 and 2 hinge on whether we are in the buy-one model or
the buy-many model. In the buy-one model, there is a polynomial-
time algorithm to compute the optimal lottery pricing system, in
contrast to the corresponding item pricing problem (namely, envy-
free unit-demand pricing [9]) which admits no constant-factor approximation [5]. However, there
is no finite upper bound on the ratio between optimal lottery revenue and optimal item-pricing
revenue as long as n > 4. In the buy-many model, the ratio is bounded by O(log n) and this bound
is tight up to a constant factor. One consequence is that optimal lottery pricing in the buy-many
model inherits the inapproximability of the corresponding item pricing problem.
Our lower bounds on the gap between optimal revenue with and without lotteries are proven
using a variety of geometric techniques. In the buy-one model, the construction relies on the geom-
etry of unit vectors in Euclidean space, whereas in the buy-many model we rely on the geometry
of degree-2 curves in the affine plane over a finite field. To obtain the matching upper bound
we introduce a novel rounding scheme to transform a lottery pricing system into one that only
prices pure outcomes while losing a bounded amount of revenue. This type of rounding is quite
challenging because, unlike in the case of rounding fractional LP solutions to integer solutions, the
objective function is very sensitive to the choices made during the rounding process: a slight change
in a lottery’s probability distribution can cause a consumer to choose a different lottery and pay
a different price, resulting in a huge change in revenue. We overcome this difficulty by coupling
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the rounding decisions made for the different items via a single random variable t, then using the
properties of optimal lottery systems in the buy-many model to bound the range of values over
which we must sample t.
Related work. As mentioned earlier, randomization is used extensively in prior-free and on-
line mechanism design (e.g., [10], and references therein), as well as for problems where optimal
deterministic truthful mechanisms are hard to compute (e.g., [8, 2, 7]).
In the economics literature, optimal multi-parameter mechanism design and pricing problems
have been studied extensively with a focus towards deterministic mechanisms (see, e.g., [3, 17]).
It is well known [15, 16] that in single-parameter Bayesian settings optimal mechanisms are de-
terministic, however no general-purpose characterization of optimal mechanisms is known in the
multi-parameter case [12, 13]. Thanassoulis [18] and Manelli and Vincent [11] independently pre-
sented examples showing that in multiple dimensions randomization can indeed increase the seller’s
revenue even when the agents’ values are drawn from a product distribution. The extent of this
improvement was unknown prior to our work.
A number of recent works in CS have explored profit maximization via “envy-free” pricing
mechanisms [1, 4, 9, 6]. For the setting that we consider, unit-demand bidders with heterogenous
items, Guruswami et al. [9] presented an approximation to the optimal envy-free pricing that is
logarithmic in the number of agents. Briest [5] showed that this is essentially the best possible, under
a certain hardness of approximation assumption for the balanced bipartite independent set problem,
and further that under the same assumption the envy-free pricing problem is inapproximable to
within a factor of O(nε) for some ε > 0. On the positive side, Chawla et al. [6] showed that when
the values of agents are drawn from a product distribution, the optimal envy-free pricing can be
approximated to within a factor of 3.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem with n distinct items and some distribution
C on possible consumer types. A consumer is given by her valuation vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ (R+0 )n
and is interested in purchasing exactly one of the items. In the classical item pricing problem, given
prices p1, . . . , pn, a consumer chooses to purchase the item i maximizing her utility vi−pi or nothing,
should this quantity happen to be negative, and the objective is to find item prices to maximize the
overall revenue. In the corresponding lottery pricing problem, rather than pricing individual items,
we are allowed to offer an arbitrary system of lotteries to the consumers. A lottery λ = (φ, p)
is defined by its probability vector φ = (φ1, . . . , φn),
∑n
i=1 φi ≤ 1, and by its price p ∈ R+0 . To
define the problem’s objective, we need to specify how consumers select the lottery (or lotteries)
to purchase from a given lottery system. This paper considers two alternatives, which we call the
buy-one and buy-many models.
The Buy-One Model. In the buy-one model, we assume that the consumer picks exactly one
lottery from the system offered to her. A consumer type v = (v1, . . . , vn) picking a lottery λ = (φ, p)
experiences an expected utility of u(v, λ) = (
∑n
i=1 φivi) − p, i.e., the expected valuation for a
random sample from φ, minus the price p. For any consumer type v and set of lotteries Λ, the
utility maximizing lotteries λ ∈ Λ form a set Λ(v) = argmaxλ∈Λ{u(v, λ)}. (This set is well-defined
assuming that Λ is a closed subset of (R+0 )
n × R+0 . We will make this assumption throughout the
paper.) Let p+(v,Λ) = max{p | (φ, p) ∈ Λ(v)} denote the maximum price3 that a utility-maximizing
3Our assumption that consumers choose the highest-priced lottery in Λ(v) is without loss of generality, up to a
multiplicative factor of (1 − ε) in the profit. This is because we can modify Λ by decreasing the price of each item
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consumer of type v might pay when choosing from the lottery set Λ. The profit of Λ is defined by
π(Λ) =
∫
p+(v,Λ) dC, where the integral can be expressed as finite weighted sums provided that C
has finite support. The lottery pricing problem in the buy-one model asks for a system of lotteries
Λ maximizing the profit π(Λ).
The Buy-Many Model. While it appears natural in the unit-demand setting that consumers
would choose to purchase a single lottery, there is a subtle issue to be considered here. Assume that
consumers can dispose freely of items and consider the following simple example with a single item,
a single consumer, and two lotteries. The consumer values the item at 1, lottery 1 has probability
1 for allocating the item and price 1/2, lottery 2 has probability 1/2 and price 2−t for some large t.
Purchasing lottery 1 yields utility 1/2, while lottery 2 yields utility 1/2− 2−t, and so the consumer
should purchase lottery 1 at price 1/2. However, imagine the consumer could decide to purchase
t copies of lottery 2 instead. The probability of receiving at least a single item in t independent
trials is 1 − 2−t and so, under the free disposal assumption, the resulting utility is 1 − (t + 1)2−t,
which is strictly better than 1/2 for t ≥ 4.
These considerations motivate the following buy-many model. Informally, a consumer in the
buy-many model can purchase any bundle (i.e., multi-set) of lotteries and receives an independent
sample from each. Given this sampling rule, the consumer chooses a utility-maximizing bundle.
More formally, for anm-tuple of lotteries (λ1, . . . , λm) with probability vectors φ1, . . . , φm and prices
p1, . . . , pm, let (i1, . . . , im) denote an m-tuple of independent random variables with distributions
φ1, . . . , φm, respectively. A consumer v purchasing (λ1, . . . , λm) experiences a utility of
u(v, λ1, . . . , λm) = E
[
max
1≤j≤m
vij
]
−
m∑
j=1
pj.
Note that u(v, λ1, . . . , λm) does not depend on the ordering of the sequence λ1, . . . , λm. When
we refer to the marginal utility of adding a lottery λ to a given bundle λ1, . . . , λm, we mean the
difference u(v, λ1, . . . , λm, λ)− u(v, λ1, . . . , λm).
As before, we can define the set ΛBM(v) of utility-maximizing bundles of lotteries for consumer
v. This set is well-defined as long as Λ is a closed subset of (R+0 )
n × R+. We can define πBM(Λ)
as the revenue achieved when selling to consumer distribution C assuming every consumer pays for
the most expensive bundle of lotteries in ΛBM(v). The lottery pricing problem in the buy-many
model asks for a system of lotteries Λ maximizing the profit πBM(Λ). Throughout the paper we
denote by r∗(C) and r∗L(C) the optimal revenue obtainable from consumer distribution C via a pure
item pricing or a lottery system in the appropriate model.
3 The Buy-One Model
We start by considering lottery pricing in the buy-one model. While it turns out that the potential
for increased revenue compared to pure item pricings is limited in dimensions 1 and 2 (as suggested
by our introductory example), surprisingly the situation changes dramatically already in dimension
4, where an arbitrary increase in revenue is possible. Remarkably, if the consumer distribution has
finite support, computing the optimal lottery system in the buy-many model reduces to solving a
linear program, thereby circumventing the known hardness results for item pricing.
by a factor of 1− ε. The discount is proportional to the original price, so the lottery in Λ(v) that is most attractive
to consumer v is the one whose modified price is (1 − ε)p+(v,Λ). Moreover, if a lottery outside Λ(v) is even more
attractive than this one, its discount must be greater than εp+(v,Λ) so its modified price must be even higher than
(1− εp+(v,Λ).
4
3.1 A Polynomial-Time Algorithm
max.
m∑
j=1
µjzj (1)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xji ≤ 1 ∀j (2)
n∑
i=1
xjivji − zj ≥ 0 ∀j (3)
n∑
i=1
xjivji − zj ≥
n∑
i=1
xkivji − zk ∀j, k (4)
Let C be a finite support distribution on
consumer types vj = (vj1, . . . , vjn) with
probabilities µj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and con-
sider the LP to the right (omitting non-
negativity constraints xji, zj ≥ 0), where
xj = (xj1, . . . , xjn) is the probability vec-
tor of a lottery offered at price zj . Con-
straints (2) ensure that lotteries are feasi-
ble. Constraints (3) guarantee that con-
sumers of type vj can afford to buy lottery
xj. Constraints (4) ensure that consumer
vj prefers lottery xj over all other xk.
Theorem 3.1 For consumers specified as a finite support distribution the optimal lottery system
in the buy-one model can be computed in polynomial time.
3.2 Lotteries in Dimensions 1 and 2
Given a consumer distribution C, by how much can the optimal lottery revenue r∗L(C) exceed the
optimal item pricing revenue r∗(C)? We first consider the base case of only a single item and prove
that offering lotteries cannot yield higher revenue than the best single item price.
Theorem 3.2 Let n = 1 and C be a consumer distribution. It holds that r∗L(C) = r∗(C).
Proof: Let Λ = {(φ0, p0), (φ1, p1), . . . , (φm, pm)} denote the optimal lottery system and assume
w.l.o.g. that 0 = φ0 < φ1 < · · · < φm and 0 = p0 ≤ p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pm. Now consider a consumer with
valuation v who decides to purchase lottery (φj , pj). Since (φj , pj) is the utility maximizing choice
it must be the case that φjv − pj ≥ φj−1v − pj−1 and φjv − pj > φj+1v − pj+1 and, thus,
v ∈
[
pj − pj−1
φj − φj−1 ,
pj+1 − pj
φj+1 − φj
]
.
Assume that we randomly assign price (pj − pj−1)/(φj − φj−1) with probability φj − φj−1 to the
item for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. For the payment P made by the consumer with value v we may write that
E[P ] =
j∑
i=1
(φi − φi−1) pi − pi−1
φi − φi−1 =
j∑
i=1
(pi − pi−1) = pj − p0 = pj,
which is just what she pays given the optimal lottery system.
Looking at the case of 2 distinct items and only allowing lotteries that have total probability
1 of allocating either of the two items, it is possible to still derive a constant bound on the ratio
between the optimal lottery and item pricing revenue. The proof, which is found in Appendix A, is
based on a combination of geometric arguments and a reduction to the 1-dimensional case above.
In dimension 2, every lottery corresponds to an indifference line, which is the set of consumer
valuations that would result in zero utility from buying this lottery (the indifferent consumers).
Fig. 2 depicts a lottery system in dimension 2 and the corresponding item pricing constructed in
the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.3 For n = 2 it holds that r∗L(C) ≤ 3r∗(C) for any consumer distribution C.
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3.3 Higher Dimensions
x*
y*
x*/2 px
y*/2
py
Figure 2: Pricing in dimen-
sion 2.
The results in Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that it should be pos-
sible to derive a general bound for the revenue gap between lottery
and item pricing depending on the problem dimension in some way.
In fact, consider the special case of consumers with uniform val-
uations, i.e., each consumer has value v for all items in some set
S and value 0 for any item from the complement of S. Grouping
consumers according to the set S they are interested in and apply-
ing the randomized rounding technique from Theorem 3.3 (using
for each lottery in the system its probability of allocating an item
from S), we obtain an upper bound of O(2n) on the revenue gap
and this turns out to be essentially tight. The proof of Theorem
3.4 is found in Appendix B.
Theorem 3.4 Let C be a distribution on uniform valuation consumers. Then r∗L(C)/r∗(C) =
O(2n). There exist distributions C with r∗L(C)/r∗(C) = Ω˜(2n).
Quite surprisingly, a similar result does not hold for general consumer distributions. We show
that the difference in revenue between the optimal item pricing and the best lottery system cannot
be bounded in terms of the number of items and, in fact, the gap can become arbitrarily large
already in dimension 4.
Theorem 3.5 For any number of items n ≥ 4 the maximum gap r∗L(C)/r∗(C) between the revenue
obtainable by a system of lotteries in the buy-one model and the optimal item pricing cannot be
bounded as a function of n.
Proof of Theorem 3.5: We view lotteries and valuations as normalized vectors in the all-
positive orthant of Rn+. The main observation is that valuation vectors with some minimum distance
from each other allow for price discrimination among these consumers via carefully chosen lotteries.
Our construction relies essentially on the following technical lemma, which gives a lower bound on
the number of valuation vectors we can pack without violating our minimum distance constraint.
Let Snr be the n-dimensional sphere with radius r centered at the origin. By S
n+
r we refer to its
intersection with the all-positive orthant Rn+. The proof of Lemma 3.6 is found in Appendix C.
Lemma 3.6 Let n ≥ 1 be given. For every q ≥ 2n there exists a set Vnq of vectors in Sn+1/√n, such
that v · w ≤ 1/n− 1/q for all v,w ∈ Vnq with v 6= w and |Vnq | = Ω(q(n−1)/2).
For a given choice of n and q let now the set of vectors Vnq = {v1, . . . , v(ℓ(q))} with ℓ(q) =
Ω(q(n−1)/2) and vi · vj ≤ 1/n − 1/q for any i 6= j be given. We will define a unit-demand pricing
instance based on these vectors. Consumer distribution C will be defined as a finite support distri-
bution. For each vj we define a consumer type with valuation vector v˜j = 2
j · vj and probability
µj = 2
−j . Since ||vj ||1 ≤
√
n||vj ||2 = 1, vectors from Vnq can also be interpreted as lotteries. We
define lotteries λj with probability vectors φj = vj and assign them price pj = (1/q) · 2j .
Consider the utility u(v˜j , λj) of consumer type v˜j when purchasing lottery λj. We may write that
u(v˜j , λj) = v˜j ·φj − (1/q) · 2j = 2j(vj)2− (1/q) · 2j = (1/n− 1/q)2j , by the fact that ||vj ||2 = 1/
√
n.
On the other hand, the consumer type’s utility from any other lottery λi is bounded above by
u(v˜j , λi) = v˜j · φi = (vj · vi) 2j ≤ (1/n − 1/q)2j , since vj · vi ≤ 1/n − 1/q for all vj, vi ∈ Vnq . Thus,
given the lottery system defined above each consumer v˜j will choose to purchase lottery λj and
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we obtain revenue
∑ℓ(q)
j=1 2
−j · (1/q) · 2j = ℓ(q)/q = Ω(q(n−3)/2), using that ℓ(q) = Ω(q(n−1)/2). It
remains to estimate the optimal item pricing revenue. Consider a single item priced at p ∈ R+
and all other items priced at +∞. For 2k−1 < p ≤ 2k consumer types v˜1, . . . , v˜k−1 surely have
valuations of less than p for all items. It follows that the total probability mass of consumers who
are able to afford the item is bounded above by
∑ℓ(q)
j=k 2
−j ≤ 2−k+1 and, thus, total revenue is at
most p · 2−k+1 ≤ 2. It follows that the optimal item pricing results in revenue of at most 2n and
for any constant n we obtain a lower bound of Ω(q(n−3)/2) on the revenue gap. In particular, we
can make this gap arbitrarily large by choosing a sufficiently large q in any dimension n ≥ 4. 
4 The Buy-Many Model
As we have argued before, the assumption made in the buy-one model that a consumer purchases
a single utility maximizing lottery from any given system is not justifiable in general. We now
continue by investigating the more realistic buy-many model, in which we allow consumers to buy
any combination of lotteries maximizing their expected utility. As we will see in Section 4.1, this
reduces the advantage lottery systems have over pure item pricings drastically. In particular, this
implies that known inapproximability results for the item pricing problem yield similar bounds in
the lottery setting and algorithmic results similar to the buy-one model cannot be obtained. In
Section 4.2 we prove that our bound on the revenue gap is asymptotically tight.
4.1 Upper Bound and Hardness of Approximation
Let an arbitrary system of lotteries in the buy-many model over n distinct items be given. We
assume throughout this section that the utility maximizing collection of lotteries for each consumer
type given this system consists of a single lottery. This assumption is w.l.o.g., as we can add
lotteries corresponding to the joint distribution of some collection of lotteries to the system until
it holds. The following randomized algorithm turns the lottery system into a pure item pricing:
(1) For each item i, let pi be the price of the cheapest lottery with probability at least 1/(130n
3)
for item i (pi = +∞ if no such lottery exists).
(2) With probability 1/2, uniformly sample t from {−1, 0, . . . , 3⌊log n⌋+9} and assign price 2tpi
to every item i.
(3) Else sample a single item i uniformly at random. Assign price +∞ to all items other than i.
Price item i at 130n3ejpi with probability (1− 1/e)e−j for all j ∈ N0.
The core idea of the algorithm is the following: Every lottery with some minimum probability
of allocating some specific item defines an upper bound on the payment of consumer types prefering
this item, since by buying multiple copies of the lottery at hand they can make the probability of
receiving the desired item approach 1 exponentially fast. Thus, for each item we let the cheap-
est lottery with some minimum probability for it define its base price and assign a random item
price via a carefully tailored two stage stochastic process. We are going to argue that the above
algorithm outputs an item pricing that is an expected O(log n)-approximation to the revenue of an
optimal lottery system in the buy-many model. Note, that the algorithm is easily derandomized
via exhaustive search over the entire range of (relevant) random coin flips. Throughout this section
we assume w.l.o.g. that
∑n
i=1 φi = 1 for every lottery. This is easily achieved by adding a dummy
item valued at 0 by all consumers to the instance.
Theorem 4.1 Given a distribution C of unit-demand consumers and an optimal lottery system in
the buy-many model, the above algorithm returns an item pricing with revenue r ≥ 1/O(log n)·r∗L(C).
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It is known that the unit-demand item pricing problem cannot be approximated within O(nε)
for some ε > 0. Thus, we immediately obtain the following inapproximability result for lottery
pricing in the buy-many model.
Corollary 4.2 The unit-demand lottery pricing problem cannot be approximated within O(nε) for
some ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ ⋂δ>0 BPTIME(2O(nδ)).
Proof of Theorem 4.1: We will show that in going from the optimal lottery system to a pure
item pricing, the expected loss in revenue is bounded by O(log n) for every single consumer type.
So let a single consumer type from C with values (v1, . . . , vn) be given. Furthermore, assume that
this consumer buys a lottery with probabilities (φ1, . . . , φn) and price p when offered the optimal
lottery system in the buy-many model. By j = argmax{vi | i : φi ≥ 1/(130n3)} we denote the
consumer’s favorite item among those for which he has at least a 1/(130n3)-chance of receiving
them.
Finally, recall that for every item i, pi denotes the price of the cheapest lottery that has proba-
bility at least 1/(130n3) for item i. We start with the observation that in any optimal lottery system
a consumer’s utility does not depend significantly on items she receives with negligible probability.
Proposition 4.3 We may w.l.o.g. assume that
∑n
i=1 φi(vi − vj) ≤ p/4.
Proof: Let C′ be the set of all consumer types for which the above does not hold. In particular,
for each consumer type in C′, if we let j again denote her favorite item with probability at least
1/(130n3) in the lottery (φ1, . . . , φn) she buys at price p, there exists an item k with φk(vk − vj) >
p/(4n). Let C′k be the set of all consumer types for which item k satisfies this inequality and consider
a single class C′k.
Remove all lotteries except for the ones bought by consumers in C′k. For the remaining lotteries,
set their probabilities for all items other than k to 0 and reduce their prices by a factor of 8n.
Now consider a single consumer type in C′k with values (v1, . . . , vn) buying lottery (φ1, . . . , φn) at
price p in the original lottery system and favorite item j among those with minimum probability
1/(130n3). We want to lower bound the revenue from this consumer given the modified system of
lotteries.
If the consumer purchases the modified version of the lottery she bought originally, revenue
has decreased by at most a factor of 8n. If she does not, she now buys some other lottery (or
a combination of lotteries) with some probability µk for item k and price q/8n. With lottery
(φ1, . . . , φn), the consumer had a chance of at least 1− (n−1)/(130n3) ≥ 1−1/(130n2) of receiving
an item valued at vj or less. Thus, the marginal utility of adding a copy of (µ1, . . . , µn) at its
original price q would have been µk(1 − 1/(130n2))(vk − vj) − q. Since the consumer chooses not
to buy a copy, we have
µk
(
1− 1
130n2
)
(vk − vj)− q ≤ 0.
We know that φkvk ≥ φk(vk − vj) ≥ p/(4n) and, thus, buying the modified version of lottery
(φ1, . . . , φn) at price p/(8n) yields utility φkvk − p/(8n) ≥ 12φkvk. Thus, it must be the case that
µk ≥ φk/2. Finally, we obtain
q ≥ µk
(
1− 1
130n2
)
(vk − vj) ≥ φk
2
(
1− 1
130n2
)
(vk − vj)
≥ 1
8n
(
1− 1
130n2
)
p.
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Thus, if the consumer purchases at price q/8n the reduction in revenue is bounded below by
1/(64n2)(1− 1/(130n2)) ≥ 1/(65n2). Now observe that all lotteries in our modified lottery system
have probability at most 1/(130n3), so we can multiply probabilities and prices of all lotteries by
130n3 without affecting any consumer’s buying decision. This effectively increases the revenue from
every consumer in C′k by a factor of (130n3)/(65n2) = 2n compared to the original optimal lottery
system.
Now assume that more than half the revenue of the original optimal lottery system was due to
consumer types in C′. Then there must exist a class C′k that carries more than a 1/(2n)-fraction of
the overall revenue, which we have just shown how to increase by a factor of 2n, a contradiction.
Hence, at most half the revenue stems from consumer types in C and we may ignore these consumer
types.
Consider the price assignments defined in Step (2) of the algorithm for different values of
t ∈ {−1, 0, . . . , 3⌊log n⌋+ 9}. We know that vj =
∑n
i=1 φivi −
∑n
i=1 φi(vi − vj) ≥ p− p/4 = (3/4)p
and, thus, for t = −1 the consumer has strictly positive utility from buying j and will consequently
purchase some item. Denote by i0 the item bought for t = −1. For increasing values of t, the
consumer might switch to other items that yield higher utility. Refer to these items as i1, . . . , iℓ in
the order they are bought.
Fact 4.4 It holds that pi0 > pi1 > · · · > piℓ and vi0 ≥ vi1 ≥ · · · ≥ viℓ.
Proof: Note that the consumer buys only if this results in non-negative utility. In going from t
to t + 1 the utility from buying any item i decreases by (2t+1 − 2t)pi = 2tpi and, thus, decreases
strictly less on cheaper items. It follows that pi0 > pi1 > · · · > piℓ .
Assume then that pij > pij+1 , but vij < vij+1 for some ij , ij+1. Then buying item ij+1 yields
strictly higher utility than ij for any value of t and ij is never bought.
We proceed by deriving a lower bound on the consumer’s utility given the original lottery system.
For t = −1, her utility from the item pricing is at least vj − pj/2 ≥ vj − p/2, since φj ≥ 1/(130n3)
and, thus, pj ≤ p by definition. Since she decides to purchase item i0, it must be the case that
vi0 ≥ vj − p/2. We may then write that
n∑
i=1
φivi − p =
n∑
i=1
φi(vi − vj) + vj − p ≤ vj − 3
4
p , since
n∑
i=1
φi(vi − vj) ≤ p
4
(5)
≤ vi0 −
p
4
, since vj ≤ vi0 +
p
2
. (6)
Next, we are going to bound the utility the consumer can achieve by focusing on item iℓ
from below. Let (µ1, . . . , µn) be the lottery defining price piℓ , i.e., the cheapest lottery in the
original system with µiℓ ≥ 1/(130n3). Now consider a strictly worse lottery with probability exactly
1/(130n3) for item iℓ, probability 0 for all other items and price piℓ . Assume that this was the only
available lottery and let k denote the number of copies our consumer would choose to purchase.
Then, by the fact that the (k + 1)-th copy does not yield positive marginal utility for her, we may
conclude that 1/(130n3)(1 − 1/(130n3))kviℓ − piℓ ≤ 0 and, thus, (1 − 1/(130n3))kviℓ ≤ 130n3piℓ .
Consequently, the utility from buying k copies is at least
(
1−
(
1− 1
130n3
)k)
viℓ − kpiℓ ≥ max
{
viℓ − (k + 130n3)piℓ , 0
}
. (7)
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By the fact that a strictly better lottery was part of the original lottery system, combining (6) and
(7) yields
vi0 −
p
4
≥
n∑
i=1
φivi − p ≥ max
{
viℓ − (k + 130n3)piℓ , 0
}
.
Finally, rearranging for p we obtain
p ≤ 4
(
vi0 − viℓ +min
{
(k + 130n3)piℓ , viℓ
})
as an upper bound on the price paid by the consumer given the original lottery system.
We proceed by proving a lower bound on the expected price paid given the item pricing returned
by our algorithm. We distinguish the following three cases.
Case (1): viℓ ≤ (k +130n3)piℓ . Let tj be the highest value of t in Step (2) of the algorithm at
which the consumer purchases item ij . Observe that as long as item ij is priced at vij − vij+1 or
less it yields higher utility than item ij+1. It follows that
2tj+1pij ≥ vij − vij+1 or, equivalently, 2tjpij ≥ (1/2)(vij − vij+1).
Using that viℓ ≤ (k + 130n3)piℓ and viℓ > 130n3(1− 1/(130n3))−(k−1)piℓ (by the fact that the k-th
copy of the lottery with probability 1/(130n3) for item iℓ at price piℓ has positive marginal utility),
it readily follows that viℓ ≤ 260n3piℓ . In particular, this implies that the range of t in Step (2) of
the algorithm includes ⌊log viℓ⌋. Let now R denote the the price paid by the consumer given the
item pricing and note that Step (2) of the algorithm is performed with probability 1/2. We have
E[R] ≥ 1
2

ℓ−1∑
j=0
Prob(t = tj)
1
2
(vij − vij+1) + Prob(t = ⌊log viℓ⌋)
viℓ
2


≥ 1
12⌊log n⌋+ 44

ℓ−1∑
j=0
(vij − vij+1) + viℓ

 = 1
12⌊log n⌋+ 44vi0 .
Case (2): viℓ > (k+130n
3)piℓ , k ≤ 130n3 +2n. In this case we know that ⌊log k+130n3⌋ lies
within the range of t in Step (2) of the algorithm. Similar to Case (1) above we obtain
E[R] ≥ 1
12⌊log n⌋+ 44
(
vi0 − viℓ + (k + 130n3)piℓ
)
.
Case (3): viℓ > (k + 130n
3)piℓ , k > 130n
3 + 2n. Once more, recall that our consumer has
positive marginal utility from buying the k-th copy of a lottery that offers a 1/(130n3)-chance of
receiving item iℓ at price piℓ . Thus,
viℓ ≥ 130n3
(
1− 1
130n3
)−(k−1)
piℓ ≈ 130n3ek−130n
3−1piℓ ,
where the above holds with arbitrary precision for large values of n. Let Aiℓ denote the event that
the algorithm chooses to perform the random experiment in Step (3) and picks item iℓ to assign a
price different from +∞ to. For the expected payment of our consumer conditioned on Aiℓ we have
E[R |Aiℓ ] ≥
k−130n3−1∑
j=0
(
1− 1
e
)
e−j130n3ejpiℓ = (k − 130n3)
(
1− 1
e
)
130n3piℓ
= (nk + (130n3 − n)k − 1302n6)
(
1− 1
e
)
piℓ ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
nkpiℓ .
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Finally, since event Aiℓ has probability 1/(2n), we obtain
E[R] ≥ 1
2

ℓ−1∑
j=0
Prob(t = tj)
1
2
(vij − vij+1)

+ 1
2n
E[R |Aiℓ ]
≥ 1
12⌊log n⌋+ 44(vi0 − viℓ) +
e− 1
2e
kpiℓ ≥
1
12⌊log n⌋+ 44
(
vi0 − viℓ + (k + 130n3)piℓ
)
.
So we have that E[R] = 1/O(log n) · p in each case, which finishes the proof. 
4.2 A Lower Bound
Finally, we will show that the bound derived in the previous section is tight. In fact, it turns out
that this is even true for the restricted case of consumers with uniform valuations. This is somewhat
surprising, as this distinction is quite significant in the buy-one model, as we have seen before.
Theorem 4.5 For all n there exist uniform-valuation consumer distributions C with r∗L(C)/r∗(C) =
Ω(log n).
Proof of Theorem 4.5: Let n ∈ N be prime and P denote the set of all distinct poly-
nomials of degree 2 over the field Z/nZ. We identify each polynomial P ∈ P with the set
SP =
{
(0, P (0)), . . . , (n − 1, P (n − 1))} ⊂ (Z/nZ)2. Observe that |P| = n3 and |SP | = n,
|SP ∩ SQ| ≤ 2 for all P 6= Q ∈ P by the fact that polynomials of maximum degree 2 over Z/nZ for
n prime have at most 2 zeroes.
We define a random pricing instance based on these polynomials as follows. The set of items
corresponds to the elements of (Z/nZ)2. Let k = ⌊log n⌋. For each P ∈ P we define a corresponding
class CP of 2k−j identical consumers with a non-zero value vP = 2j−k for the items in SP , where j
is drawn uniformly at random from {1, . . . , k}. Let C = ⋃P CP denote the complete instance.
The proof of the lower bound proceeds in two steps. We first argue that with non-zero prob-
ability our random experiment creates a pricing instance on which every pure item pricing yields
revenue O(n3/ log n). We then show that for every instance created by the experiment we can find
a lottery system that yields revenue Ω(n3).
Lemma 4.6 Let C be a random pricing instance as defined above. It holds that r∗(C) = O(n3/ log n)
with positive probability.
Proof: Let p be a price vector resulting in revenue r on some instance created by our ran-
dom experiment. Then there must exist another price vector p′ that assigns only prices from
{21−k, 22−k, . . . , 20} and makes revenue at least r/2 by sales to consumers buying at a price equal
to their value. To see this, note that it is w.l.o.g. to assume that prices are powers of 2 and as
long as more than half the revenue generated by a price vector p comes from consumers buying at
a price no more than half their values, we can increase revenue by doubling all prices. Thus, since
the identical consumers in each class CP contribute a total revenue of 1 if they buy at their full
values, we only need to prove that with positive probability no price vector extracts the full value
of consumers in more than O(n3/ log n) different classes CP .
Consider a fixed price vector p and let Tj denote the set of items priced at 2
j−k for j = 1, . . . , k.
By Bj we denote the set of consumer classes with a non-zero value for at least one item in Tj and
value zero for all items in T1, . . . , Tj−1, formally,
Bj = {CP |SP ∩ Tj 6= ∅} \
(j−1⋃
i=1
Bi
)
.
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A set CP ∈ Bj of consumers yields revenue 1 if and only if their random value is vP = 2j−k. Let
random variable Yj denote the number of consumer classes in Bj that pay their full values given
price vector p. We will bound Yj in two steps. If |Bj| ≤ n3/(log n)2, then it trivially holds that
Yj ≤ |Bj | ≤ n3/(log n)2. If |Bj | > n3/(log n)2, let XjP be a random indicator variable with XjP = 1
if vP = 2
j−k and XjP = 0 else. Thus, Prob(X
j
P = 1) = 1/k. It follows that that
Yj =
∑
P :CP∈Bj
XjP and E[Yj] =
1
k
|Bj |.
Applying the Chernoff bound [14] and using that |Bj| > n3/(log n)2 and k ≤ log n we obtain
Prob
(
Yj ≥ 6
k
|Bj|
)
≤ 2− 6k |Bj | ≤ 2−6
“
n
log n
”3
.
Thus, we have that Yj ≤ max{n3/(log n)2, 12|Bj |/(log n)} with probability at least 1− 2−6
“
n
log n
”3
.
Let Y =
∑
j Yj. Applying the union bound yields
Y =
k∑
j=1
Yj ≤
k∑
j=1
(
n3
(log n)2
+
12|Bj |
log n
)
= k
n3
(log n)2
+
12
∑k
j=1 |Bj|
log n
≤ 13n
3
log n
with probability at least 1 − 2−5
“
n
log n
”3
. Finally, observe that there are at most kn
2
different
price vectors with prices in {21−k, . . . , 20}. Applying the union bound once again the probability
that any of these extracts full values from more than 13n3/ log n consumer classes is at most
(log n)n
2
2
−5
“
n
log n
”3
< 1 for n ≥ 2.
Lemma 4.7 Let C be any pricing instance as defined above. It holds that r∗L(C) = Ω(n3).
Proof: We construct a system of lotteries as follows. For every consumer class CP with value vP for
items in set SP , we introduce a lottery φP with probability 1/n for each of the items in SP at price
vP /2. A consumer from class CP has utility vP − (1/2)vP = (1/2)vP from purchasing lottery φP .
By the fact that |SP ∩SQ| ≤ 2 for all Q 6= P , any other lottery φQ has probability of at most 2/n of
allocating an item in set SP . We also know that, since k ≤ log n, we have vQ ≥ 2−kvP ≥ (1/n)vP
and, thus, a consumer from CP has utility at most (2/n)vP − (1/2)vQ ≤ (2/n)vP − (1/(2n))vP =
(3/(2n))vP . Since the same bounds the marginal utility of any lottery other than φP being bought
in addition to some other set of lotteries, it follows that consumers in CP either purchase lottery
φP at price vP/2 or some set of at least ((1/2)vP )/((3/(2n))vP ) = (1/3)n lotteries at price at least
(1/n)vP each, resulting in overall revenue at least (1/3)vP from each of these consumers. Summing
over all classes CP and the consumers in each class yields overall revenue of (1/3)n3.
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A The Buy-One Model in Dimension 2
In the 2-dimensional setting, we will refer to the two distinct items as the x-item and y-item. A
given consumer valuation is a point (vx, vy) ∈ (R+0 )2. For a given lottery with probabilities (φx, φy)
and φx+φy = 1 (an assumption we make throughout this section) and price p we call the set of all
(x, y) with φxx+ φyy = p its indifference line. This corresponds to the set of consumer valuations
that result in zero utility from buying this lottery. Geometrically, it is a line with x-intercept p/φx
and y-intercept p/φy. Similarly, any arbitrary line in the plane with positive x- and y-intercepts
corresponds to a lottery. The following Lemma gives an easy geometric interpretation of a lottery’s
price.
Lemma A.1 Given a line with positive x- and y-intercepts, the price of the corresponding lottery
is the x-coordinate (or y-coordinate) of its intersection with the diagonal x = y.
Proof: Consider lottery λ = ((φx, φy), p) and the valuation (vx, vy) at the intersection of its indif-
ference line with the diagonal. Since vx = vy and φx+φy = 1, this consumer’s value for the lottery
is vx. In addition, because she is on the indifference line of λ, we have vx = p.
Let a consumer distribution C and a system of lotteries Λ be given. Consider a consumer
with valuation (vx, vy) from C who receives utility u from the lottery she picks from Λ and let
δ = min{u, vx, vy}. We can replace this consumer’s valuation with (vx− δ, vy − δ) without affecting
her selection, since her expected utility from every lottery has decreased by exactly δ or all the way
down to 0. In particular, if we were to modify the lottery system, it would be guaranteed that as
long as the consumer with valuations (vx− δ, vy− δ) can afford to buy any lottery, the same lottery
would be bought by a consumer with valuation (vx, vy).
We can use this observation to significantly simplify the kinds of consumer distributions we
have to consider. Given C and Λ, we define C′ as above by replacing each consumer type (vx, vy)
in C with (vx − δ, vy − δ). As argued before, this does not change the revenue of lottery system Λ
and for every lottery system (or item pricing) it holds that its revenue on C is an upper bound on
its revenue on C′.
By construction every consumer in C′ has either utility 0 from the lottery she purchases or has
valuation 0 for either the x- or y-item. Geometrically, all consumer types lie either on the positive
part of one of the coordinate axes or on the boundary of the set of consumer types that cannot
afford to purchase any lottery from Λ. Geometrically, the set of consumer types unable to afford
any lottery is the intersection of the halfspaces defined by the lotteries in Λ and, consequently, its
boundary is the intersection of a convex polygon with the coordinate system’s first quadrant. This
situation is depicted in Fig. 2.
We denote by C′x, C′y, and C′0 the consumer types from distribution C′ that lie on the x-axis,
y-axis, or on the indifference polygon defined by the indifference lines, respectively. Let x∗ and y∗
denote the x- and y-intersects of the indifference polygon. The following algorithm turns lottery
system Λ into a pure item pricing.
(1) With probability 1/3, split every lottery λ = ((φx, φy), p) ∈ Λ into two lotteries λx =
((φx, 0), p), λy = ((0, φy), p) and let Λx = {λx |λ ∈ Λ}, Λy = {λy |λ ∈ Λ}. Independently run
the randomized rounding procedure described in Theorem 3.2 on both the lotteries in Λx and
Λy.
(2) With probability 2/3 choose δ, such that (x∗/2+ δ, y∗/2+ δ) lies on the indifference polygon.
(Note, that (x∗/2, y∗/2) lies inside the polygon by convexity and, thus, δ is well defined.)
Assign prices px = x
∗/2 + δ and py = y∗/2 + δ to the items.
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We proceed by analyzing the expected revenue of the returned item pricing. For consumers in
C′x and C′y it immediately follows from the analysis in Theorem 3.2 that their expected payment
given the pure item prices is exactly the same as given lottery system Λ. Since Step (1) of the
algorithm is performed with probability 1/3, the expected revenue from consumers in C′x and C′y is
decreased by a factor of 3.
Let us then fix a consumer from C′0 with valuations (vx, vy) located somewhere on the indifference
polygon. By Lemma A.1 the price paid by this consumer given the lottery system is the x-coordinate
of the intersection of the tangent line to the indifference polygon in (vx, vy) with the diagonal x = y.
We consider three cases.
Assume first that vx < px. Then, given the item pricing, the consumer will choose to buy the
y-item at price py = y
∗/2 + δ ≥ y∗/2. Recall that we assume w.l.o.g. that y∗ ≥ x∗. Since by
convexity no tangent line can intersect the diagonal above y∗, the consumer’s payment decreases
by at most a factor of 2.
Let then vx ≥ px. Assume first that vx ≥ vy. By convexity, no tangent line to the polygon
in this region can intersect the diagonal above x∗ and the same argument as in the previous case
bounds our loss in revenue by a factor of 2.
Finally, assume that vx ≥ px and vx < vy. The tangent line to the polygon in point (px, py) can
be written as y = y∗− ((y∗−py)/px)x. By convexity, (vx, vy) lies below this line and the tangent in
this point has smaller slope. Consequently, its intersection with the diagonal is upper bounded by
the intersection of the tangent line in (px, py) with the diagonal, which is defined by the equation
x = y∗ − y
∗ − py
px
x.
Observe that py − px = y∗/2− x∗/2 ≤ y∗/2. We obtain that
x =
(
1 +
y∗ − py
px
)−1
y∗
=
y∗
y∗ − (py − px)px ≤ 2px,
which again yields a bound of 2 on the loss in revenue. Since Step (2) of the algorithm is performed
with probability 2/3, we expect a total loss of at most a factor 3.
Theorem 3.3 For n = 2 it holds that r∗L(C) ≤ 3r∗(C) for any consumer distribution C.
B Uniform Valuations in the Buy-One Model
Let C be a distribution over uniform-valuation consumers. Formally, every consumer type in C is
of the form (S, v), where S is a subset of the items and v the value for any item from S. The value
for items from the complement of S is 0.
Upper Bound. Let a consumer distribution C and a lottery system Λ be given. We partition
C into partial distributions CS for all possible item sets S, where CS contains all consumer types
interested in item set S. Pick one CT uniformly at random and consider the set of one-dimensional
lotteries ΛT = {(
∑
i∈T φi, p) | ((φ1, . . . , φn), p) ∈ Λ}. Apply the randomized rounding procedure
described in Theorem 3.2 to ΛT and assign the resulting price to all items.
As shown in Theorem 3.2 the revenue from consumer distribution CT does not decrease and,
since every CS is picked with probability 1/(2n − 1), the overall expected decrease in revenue is
bounded above by a factor of 2n.
16
Lower Bound. Let k = 2n−2 and S0, . . . , Sk be all distinct non-empty subsets of [n] ordered by
decreasing cardinality, i.e., |S0| ≥ |S1| ≥ · · · ≥ |Sk|. We define a consumer distribution as follows.
For all 0 ≤ j ≤ k we have a consumer type cj = (Sj , nj) with probability n−j((1−n−1)/(1−n−k−1)).
Similarly, lottery system Λ contains a lottery λj for each 0 ≤ j ≤ k, where λj has probability 1/|Sj |
for each item in Sj and price n
j−1. The utility u(cj , λj) of consumer type cj from buying lottery λj
is u(cj , λj) = n
j − nj−1. For i < j we know that |Si\Sj| ≥ 1 and, thus, the probability that lottery
λi allocates an item from set Sj is at most 1 − 1/n. Thus, cj ’s utility from buying λi is bounded
above by u(cj , λi) ≤ (1 − 1/n)nj = nj − nj−1. Finally, lotteries λi with i > j are too expensive
for this consumer type to afford. Thus, we may assume that each consumer type cj chooses to
purchase lottery λj when offered Λ. The total revenue obtained by Λ then can be written as
k∑
j=0
n−j
1− n−1
1− n−k−1n
j−1 ≥ 1
n
(2n − 2).
On the other hand, consider any pure item pricing. If the price of some item falls into the interval
(nj−1, nj], then the total probability mass of consumer types able to afford this item is bounded
above by 2n−j and, thus, the total revenue from this item cannot exceed nj · 2n−j = 2. Summing
over all items yields a bound of 2n on the overall revenue obtainable by any item pricing.
Theorem 3.4 Let C be a distribution on uniform valuation consumers. Then r∗L(C)/r∗(C) = O(2n).
There exist distributions cd with r∗L(C)/r∗(C) = Ω˜(2n).
C Vector Packing
Lemma 3.6 Let n ≥ 1 be given. For every q ≥ 2n there exists a set Vnq of vectors in Sn+1/√n, such
that v · w ≤ 1/n− 1/q for all v,w ∈ Vnq with v 6= w and |Vnq | = Ω(q(n−1)/2).
Proof: For vectors v,w ∈ Sn+
1/
√
n
we may write that
v · w = 1
2
(
v2 + w2 − (v − w)2) = 1
n
− 1
2
||v − w||22.
Consequently, the condition that v · w ≤ 1/n − 1/q for all v,w ∈ Vnq is equivalent to asking that
a ball of radius
√
2/q around the tip of any vector from Vnq does not contain the tip of any of the
other vectors. For the remainder of this proof we will associate vectors in Vnq with n-dimensional
balls of radius
√
2/q centered at their tips.
We construct the set Vnq by the following simple greedy approach. While there exists a point in
Sn+
1/
√
n
that is not covered by previously selected balls, we choose it as the center of a new ball of
radius
√
2/q.
We now have to lower bound the number of vectors found in this fashion. When the procedure
terminates, it must be the case that Sn+
1/
√
n
is completely covered by the selected balls. Choose any
ε > 0. By Bnr we denote the n-dimensional ball of radius r centered at the origin, B
n+
r its part in
the all-positive orthant. If we increase the radius of all balls chosen by our packing procedure by
ε
√
2/q, we know that they completely cover the set
Bn+
1/
√
n+ε
√
2/q
−Bn+
1/
√
n−ε
√
2/q
,
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as all points in this set are at distance at most ε
√
2/q from Sn+
1/
√
n
. The n-dimensional Lebesgue
measure of this set is
λn(Bn+
1/
√
n+ε
√
2/q
−Bn+
1/
√
n−ε
√
2/q
) = 2−n
(
(
√
1/n + ε
√
2/q)n − (
√
1/n− ε
√
2/q)n
)
λn(Bn1 ),
where λn(Bn1 ) denotes the measure of the n-dimensional unit ball. Similarly, each ball of radius
(1 + ε)
√
2/q has measure (
(1 + ε)
√
2/q
)n
λn(Bn1 ),
and it follows that the number of balls selected by our procedure is at least
2−n
((√
1/n + ε
√
2/q
)n − (√1/n − ε√2/q)n)(
(1 + ε)
√
2q
)n
≥
2−n+1ε
√
2/q · n
(√
1/n − ε√2/q)n−1(
(1 + ε)
√
2q
)n
≥
2−n+1ε
√
2/q · n
(
(1− ε)√1/n)n−1(
(1 + ε)
√
2q
)n
=
εn
(
(1− ε)√1/n)n−1
(1 + ε)n2(3n−3)/2
q(n−1)/2 = Ω(q(n−1)/2),
where the first inequality follows by lower-bounding the difference between the two terms of the
enumerator by 2ε
√
(2/q) times the derivative of the convex function xn in
√
1/n− ε√2/q and the
second inequality uses the fact that
√
2/q ≤√1/n.
18
